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Rent seeking is well known, but empirical evidence of its effects is relatively rare. This paper 
analyzes the how domestic and international rent seeking caused Brazil to provide coffee export 
tax rebates that transferred foreign exchange to coffee importers. Although Brazil was the 
world’s largest exporter, it began to pay export tax rebates to selected coffee importers in 1965 
and, by 1988, had paid rebates totaling $8 billion. Brazil explained these rebates as a mechanism 
to price discriminate among importers and expand exports within the context of the export quota 
imposed by the International Coffee Agreement. We show this explanation was invalid during 
most of the period. The net price fell for those who received rebates, causing Brazil to effectively 
transfer approximately $3 billion to foreign importers. The effects of the rebate policy were 
never recognized in Brazil, hidden largely by the complex nature of government intervention in 
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How Brazil Transferred Billions to Foreign Coffee Importers: 
 
 The International Coffee Agreement, Rent Seeking and Export Tax Rebates 
 
Lovell S. Jarvis 
Introduction. To raise the price of coffee, the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) 
imposed a global quota on the amount of coffee that producing countries could export during 
most of the period 1963-1989.  Brazil, the world’s largest coffee producer, received the largest 
share of the quota. Although the quota may have increased the international price and thus 
improved Brazil’s gross terms of trade1, the quota also created large quota rents within Brazil 
and these rents motivated considerable rent seeking activity.  Much has been written about rent 
seeking, e.g., Krueger, 1973, but there are few detailed empirical studies because the effects of 
rent seeking are often hard to document.   
Rent seeking in Brazil occurred in many of the traditional forms (Jarvis 2001).  However, 
an exceptional, but previously unidentified example of how rent seeking affected the coffee 
sector involves Brazil’s use of coffee export tax rebates.  These rebates were introduced soon 
after the ICA quota was implemented.  The amount of these rebates was initially small, 
averaging $21million per year during 1965-69, but grew rapidly and reached a peak of nearly $2 
billion in 1981.  In total, between 1965 and 1989, Brazil emitted more than $8 billion in coffee 
export tax rebates, thereby reducing Brazil’s net export taxes.  The export tax rebates stimulated 
international demand for Brazilian coffee, causing the nominal price of Brazil’s coffee to rise 
relative to those of its competitors. However, the net export price declined, causing Brazil to 
transfer billions of dollars to foreign coffee importers and other rebate recipients.2  The latter 
                                                 
1 Akiyama and Verangis (1990) present credible estimates suggesting that the ICA may not have increased the 
international price when an average is calculated over the coffee cycle.   
2 This rent transfer is distinct in type from the rent transfers identified by Krishna and Tan (1992) and by Krishna et   2
effects appear to have been wholly unintended and were misunderstood aspects of the use of 
rebates.   
  The rebates were initially justified as a means to price discriminate and increase Brazil’s 
coffee revenues (Delfim Netto and Andrade Pinto, 1965).  Once this policy had come under fire, 
rebates were justified as necessary to maintain the competitiveness of Brazilian coffee, given that 
Brazil required exporters to pay export taxes and turn over foreign exchange reserves based on a 
government-imposed Minimum Registration Price that sometimes exceeded the prices of 
Brazil’s competitors (Bacha 1992).  While the first justification for the rebates was theoretically 
plausible, the number of rebates issued quickly grew to exceed the amount that could have been 
economically justified as price discrimination, given known parameters of the coffee market.  
The second justification was invalid since the Minimum Registration Price had little effect on the 
price at which coffee was actually sold. Brazilian coffee was fully competitive without the export 
tax rebates.  The best explanation for the abundant emission of export tax rebates is that they 
provided benefits to recipients, who engaged in rent-seeking activity to obtain more rebates. 
  Subsequent sections: 1) provide background information, 2) develop and apply a model 
to test whether using the export tax rebates to price discriminate could have benefited Brazil, 3) 
develop and econometrically estimate a model measuring the effect of the export tax rebates on 
the export price of Brazil’s coffee and thus determine the incidence of the tax rebates, and 4) 
present conclusions.  
 Background.  Following a similar study in Indonesia (Bohman, et al. 1996), Bohman 
and I interviewed a number of Brazilian coffee sector participants in June-July 1994, to obtain 
information that would allow us to determine who had captured the ICA domestic quota rents in 
Brazil.  During these interviews, Brazilian coffee exporters frequently mentioned their dealings 
                                                                                                                                                             
al., 1993, as having occurred within the context of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.   3
in Avisos de Garantia (hereafter avisos), a negotiable, dollar-denominated export tax rebate paid 
by the Brazilian Institute of Coffee (IBC) to foreign importers that purchased Brazilian coffee 
during most of the period that the ICA was in effect.  Though these avisos seemed important, we 
were consistently told that they had only a neutral role, simply offsetting another policy-induced 
market distortion.  It nonetheless became clear to me that the avisos’ effect might not have been 
neutral and, without so determining, it was impossible to understand the disposition of Brazil’s 
domestic coffee quota rent (Jarvis, 2001).  Thus, I began to analyze the effect of the avisos.   
  Though the Brazilian coffee industry was mainly in private hands, the IBC strongly 
affected the coffee sector’s operation.  Created in 1953 to formulate and implement Brazilian 
coffee policy, domestically and internationally, the IBC was given great power.  This power 
reflected coffee’s importance in the Brazilian economy and the widespread national view that 
manipulating coffee production and exports was key to Brazilian economic success. The IBC 
influenced export prices through numerous policies, especially the export tax (tcq, known as the 
contribution quota) and the minimum export registration price (PMR). Technically, exporters were 
not allowed to sell Brazilian coffee for less than PMR, though they could and often did so.3 After 
1965, the IBC also provided export tax rebates to many importers. In addition, the IBC 
established a Guaranteed Minimum Price (PGM) at which it stood ready to purchase all coffee 
offered by producers.  Nonetheless, producers, mainly small and medium-sized farmers, usually 
sold coffee to private exporters at the open market producer price, PD.  PD usually exceeded PGM, 
because the IBC purchased coffee only for storage. Throughout the period studied, Brazil’s 
coffee producing states levied an additional coffee tax, ts, on all sales, domestic and foreign. 
                                                 
3 The IBC used PMR as the basis for determining the amount of foreign exchange that exporters had to deliver to the 
Central Bank and, after 1985, as the basis for levying the ad valorem export tax. Producers had to declare that they 
had sold coffee for at least that amount. However, producers sold at whatever was the world price, purchased foreign 
exchange in the black market if needed and then adjusted the price they were willing to pay to farmers for coffee.    4
  A large domestic quota rent existed whenever the ICA quota was in effect (Bohman and 
Jarvis, 1990; Bohman et al., 1996).  The IBC effectively determined the disposition of the 
domestic quota rent insofar as it allocated the quota among exporters and set the export tax and 
the export tax rebate.  Although the government captured part of the domestic quota rent through 
the export tax, Jarvis (2001) estimates that an important residual rent remained and was captured 
by exporters to whom quota was allocated. Foreign coffee importers captured a larger part of the 
rent, however, as a result of Brazil's payment of export tax rebates.  These effects are briefly 
modeled below.4   
  The government allocated the quota among exporters, who received it free of charge, 
subject to the need to pay the export tax. Exporters purchased coffee at PD, measured inclusive of 
exporters’ marketing and processing costs, and sold coffee on the member market at PA’.  See 
Figure 1.  The demand curve for Brazilian coffee, DB, intersected qA, Brazil’s quota for exports 
to the ICA member market, at PA, the counterfactual member market price that I assume would 
have prevailed in the absence of export tax rebates.  PA’ was higher than PA if the stimulus 
provided by export tax rebates caused importers to bid up Brazil’s nominal export price.   
  The observed unit quota rent (per bag sold) on sales to the member market, gross of 
export and sales taxes, was rg = PA’- PD. 5    After paying the taxes, exporters that received export 
quota earned the residual or net rent, rn, with rn = rg - tcq, where tcq is the per bag export tax.  The 
IBC collected the export tax and issued export tax rebates (avisos) to foreign importers. 
                                                 
4 Producers captured rents only to the extent that they individually or collectively received a quota allocation and 
this happened very little in Brazil. Indeed, producers probably suffered from a reduced producer price as a result of 
the ICA quota.  Bohman and Jarvis (1996) develop a theoretical model to explain why, given likely policies in 
coffee-producing countries, the producer price of coffee should decline whenever ICA quotas are imposed.  Their 
econometric results suggest that the producer price of coffee did fall in most countries, including Brazil. 
5  Trade among ICA-member nations, importers and exporters, accounted for 80-85% of coffee traded 
internationally. Coffee was also sold by to importers in the non-member market, but at a large discount, usually 
about 50%, whenever the ICA quota was imposed.  Brazil sold about 10% of its coffee on the non-member market.  
It appears that Brazil usually sold to the non-member market at a price that approximated PD.     5
Although little is known about the amounts rebated to individual importers, the aggregate annual 
value of export tax rebates, Α, is known.  The average annual unit rebate paid per bag of coffee 
exported to the member market, α, can be determined by dividing Α by qA, where qA is the 
number of bags exported to the member market, i.e. α = Α/qA.  The government’s net export tax 
revenue per bag was tcq - α. 
  Although the government paid a unit tax rebate, α, to foreign importers, I hypothesize 
that these importers did not benefit in like amount because the rebates reduced the net price of 
Brazilian coffee and thus stimulated importers to purchase more coffee, resulting in a higher 
market price.  In the extreme case, the export tax rebate could have increased the nominal 
Brazilian export price by α, leaving the net export price faced by importers unchanged.  It is 
generally understood in Brazil that this is what happened.  However, if Brazil’s nominal export 
price rose by less than α, foreign roasters enjoyed some net gain, α’, where α’ = α - (PA’ - PA).  
Again, see Figure 1.  
  The economic gains enjoyed by exporters, foreign roasters and the federal government 
given their participation in the domestic quota rent was their unit gain multiplied by quota 
exports.  These gains can be expressed as: 
1) Exporters: RE = (rg - tcq) qA 
2) Foreign roasters: Α’ = [α - (PA’ - PA)] qA 
3) Federal Government, including the IBC: T = (tcq - α) qA 
IBC officials participated privately in the rent if they received side payments that were linked to 
exporters’ or roasters’ gains.  Since there is no way to measure such clandestine payments, if 
they occurred, their magnitude is included in the estimated gains of exporters and foreign   6
importers. The aggregate gain of the participants, achieved by summing equations 1) through 3), 
equals the total potential rent, R: 
R = RE + Α’ + T = qA[(rg - tcq) +  α - (PA’ - PA) + (tcq - α)] 
    = qA[rg - (PA’ - PA)]= qA[PA’ - PD - PA’ + PA]= qA (PA - PD) 
Note that R is independent of α and the degree to which the international price was bid up as a 
result of the export tax rebates. However, the distribution of R among the different actors is 
dependent on α and on how α affected the international price.   
Export Tax Rebates.  When Brazil first received an ICA country export quota in 1963, 
the IBC imposed a large export tax that restricted exports to less than them amount of the quota 
that Brazil had been awarded.  The IBC did so believing that Brazil had market power even 
within the quota amount (Bacha 1992).  However, the IBC changed it policy in 1965 to ensure 
that it fulfilled its quota.  It began to sign secret discriminatory contracts with a few large 
importers, paying them export tax rebates in exchange for their commitment to purchase a larger 
amount of coffee each year and to spread their purchases evenly throughout the year.  The IBC 
argued that although world coffee demand was inelastic, the demand for coffee from individual 
countries (roasters) was highly price elastic, implying that Brazilian exports could be profitably 
increased via a price discount (Delfim Netto 1959, Delfim Netto and Pinto 1965).  
Internationally, the coffee importing and roasting industry was highly concentrated.6  Brazil 
therefore thought that it could “exert its capacity to discriminate among buyers according to their 
respective bargaining power” (Bacha, 1992).7 
                                                 
6 The three largest foreign importers, Nestle, General Foods and Procter and Gamble accounted for about 20% of 
total world imports in the 1960s and about 30% in the 1980s. 
7  The prices of different types and grades of coffee are highly correlated, but relative prices vary somewhat over 
time and such variations induce changes in consumption.   7
 Because private firms handled all coffee exports, to achieve the desired price 
discrimination the IBC had to develop some mechanism like the export tax rebates. This 
mechanism had to ensure that any importer that signed a long-term contract could purchase 
coffee from any exporter and pay only the agreed discounted price, while also ensuring that the 
exporter received the actual market price.  The mechanism adopted was a negotiable, U.S. dollar-
denominated certificate called an Aviso de Garantia that was issued by the IBC to a roaster on 
completion of a purchase. Importers could redeem the certificate when making their next 
purchase.8  Thus, assuming repeated purchases, the rebate reduced the net price of coffee to the 
purchaser, but not to the exporter or farmer. While the formulas that determined the specific 
export tax rebates to individual importers were secret, it is known that the magnitude of the 
rebates was tied to the difference between Brazil’s export price and an average of its main 
competitors’ prices, as listed on the New York and London markets.  
The Use of Export Tax Rebates to Price Discriminate.  The hypothesis that the rapid 
rise in export tax rebates was a response to rent seeking can be tested using the model of price 
discrimination shown in Figure 2.  Demand for Brazilian coffee is divided into two components, 
one from the largest foreign importers, DII, who are assumed to have purchased about 40% of 
Brazil’s member market exports prior to initiation of the export tax rebates, and the other from 
all other exporters, DI.  See Figure 2a.  When the price is PA, total member market exports equal 
qI
0 + qII
0, which is assumed less than the Brazilian quota. Provision of a unit export tax rebate, α, 
to the largest importers is assumed to expand sales to these importers from qII
0 to qII
1, and thus 
expand total member market exports by the same amount.9 For the scheme to work as intended, 
                                                 
8 The aviso certificates were traded on an informal New York market throughout the period that was maintained 
among coffee trading companies.  In general, aviso certificates traded at only a small discount to their  face value.   
9 Since the export tax rebates were provided only to the largest importers, these contracts were referred to in Brazil 
as “special deals.”   8
the (negotiated) demand of the largest importers had to be more price elastic than the demand of 
the other importers.  For simplicity, the demand curve for other importers is assumed perfectly 
inelastic.  
PA is the initial price at which Brazil exported coffee to the member market and PN is 
taken as the opportunity cost of coffee exports.  Brazil’s benefit from exporting an additional bag 
of coffee to the member market, where PA is assumed constant, was PA - α - PN. Brazil gained 
from issuing rebates only so long as the increased rent (area E) from expanding member market 
exports (q
0 II to q
1
II) was larger than the export revenue sacrificed on previous exports as a result 
of the tax rebate (area A).10  If the value of the rebates issued greatly exceeded a reasonable 
estimate of area E-A, the use of export tax rebates must have reduced Brazilian welfare.  If so, it 
follows that tax rebates were probably used for reasons other than simply to price discriminate. 
According to Bacha (Statistical Appendix, 1992), Brazil exported 15.7 million 60 kg. 
bags from 1959-1964, systematically underselling its member market quota (which averaged 
17.5 million bags) by about 12%, or 1.8 million bags.  Since private agents carried out trade, 
Brazil must have imposed an export tax greater than PA - PD, thus keeping the export price above 
the level that would have allowed the export quota to be filled.  Accordingly, an export tax rebate 
could effectively lower the international price to favored importers.  If the rebate allowed Brazil 
to achieve its quota, these favored importers must have increased their purchases from 6.28 
million bags (assumed to have been 40% of the 15.7 million bags exported), prior to the rebates, 
to 8.08 million bags.  The net gain to Brazil depended on the unit export tax rebate that was 
required to achieve this increase.   
Knowing α, Brazil’s estimated economic gain from aviso use can be calculated as:  
                                                 
10 Revenue was lost only on exports to the favored large foreign importers; other importers did not receive rebates.    9
4)  E – A = (qII
1 – qII
0)(PA - α - PN) - α qII
o = (qII
1 – qII
0)(PA - PN) - α qII
1,  
where the quantities exported refer to the aggregate amount purchased by the favored foreign 
roasters who received the “special deals” from the IBC. Utilizing the actual parameter values 
prevailing in 1964 11, the increase in exports is assumed to be 1.8 million bags, the amount by 
which Brazil was previously underselling its quota.  The difference between PA and PN was 
$23.33.  E, the potential gain from expanding exports, is 1.8 million bags multiplied by 
$23.33/bag, or $42 million. A, the revenue sacrificed to achieve E, was approximately the value 
of the avisos emitted, which averaged $21 million during 1966-69.12 If my estimate is correct, 
Brazil and the favored foreign importers roughly split the benefits to Brazil from expanding 
member market exports ($42 million).  Thus, the amount of rebates initially emitted was 
consistent with the use of tax rebates to achieve a profitable “price discrimination,” as argued by 
Delfim Netto and Andrade Pinto (1965). 
  Note that these calculations underestimate the profitability of the export tax rebate 
scheme if the rebates caused exporters to bid up the price of Brazilian coffee, as I subsequently 
show did occur.  If the rebates caused a nominal price increase, the net cost of any nominal 
rebate was lower, since the higher price increased revenues to Brazil (Figure 2b).  For example, 
assuming that the export price rose by about half the unit export tax rebate, where the unit export 
tax rebate is calculated by dividing the total value of rebates by total quota exports, the net cost 
of the rebates was about half the nominal cost.  On this basis, Brazil could have issued about $84 
million in avisos before exhausting the benefits that the higher exports achieved under the 
assumed initial conditions. 
                                                 
11 PA = $46.66, PN = $23.33, qII
0 = 6.28 million bags, and qII1= 8.08 million bags. 
12 Rebates were initiated in late 1965; 1966 is the first whole year during which rebates were paid.   10
  Nonetheless, the value of export tax rebates increased rapidly after 1969 and soon 
exceeded even this higher level, e.g., the value of the avisos emitted averaged $86 million 
annually in 1971-72.13  Then, even though the ICA lapsed between 1972 and 1979, the amount 
of export tax rebates to the same few favored international roasters rose further, averaging $277 
million per year (see Table 1) during this period.  Note that the size of area E in Figure 2 depends 
importantly on the existence of a large difference between the export price of coffee and the 
marginal cost of production, a difference that depends importantly on the existence of an export 
quota and a quota rent. Since there was no quota from 1972 to 1979, and thus no such price 
differential between the export price and the marginal cost of production, the rebates could not 
play any role in price discrimination.  They simply reduced the net export tax.   
  Widespread allegations of corruption associated with the “special deals” caused the IBC 
to abandon the secret discriminatory contracts in 1979 (Bacha, 1992).  The government 
considered proposals to abandon the use of a Minimum Registration Price and other aspects of 
the government’s coffee management policy, including export rebates, and move instead toward 
a free market system.  This recommendation was rejected “at the highest level of government” 
(Bacha, 1992) and a decision was instead made to continue use of the Minimum Registration 
Price, along with the export tax rebates.  The IBC then initiated new “standard contracts” under 
which all importers were to be provided a rebate whenever the Minimum Registration Price 
exceeded a weighted average of the international prices of Brazil’s competitors (Other Milds and 
Robusta). 
This standard contract was justified as being necessary to ensure that Brazilian exports 
remained competitive even when the Minimum Registration Price was set above the world price.  
                                                 
13 The annual estimates are adjusted to account for changes in international prices, though these were small 
throughout this period.  The volume of exports also showed little year to year variation.   11
This was an important policy change. Export export tax rebates were no longer justified as being 
an instrument to achieve price discrimination, but instead to offset the distortion caused by the 
Minimum Registration Price.14  That is, the IBC justified the use of the Minimum Registration 
Price to ensure a reliable basis for taxing coffee exports and ensuring delivery of adequate 
foreign exchange.  Then, since the administratively determined Minimum Registration Price 
(PMR) was said to be intermittently higher than the international price of coffee from competitors, 
the IBC argued that export tax rebates were needed to ensure that private exporters could remain 
competitive with exporters from other countries during such periods. This argument was widely 
accepted and was still thought valid throughout much of private industry in Brazil in 1994 when 
I interviewed many coffee exporters.   
In fact, the argument seems to have had no validity.  Private private exporters did not sell 
coffee at PMR, but instead at whatever was the going international price for Brazilian coffee (PA’).  
The government had no control over the price at which coffee was sold internationally and did 
not even collect data on actual transactions.  Exporters indicate that if they sold coffee at a price 
below PMR, they paid an export tax based on the higher PMR and purchased foreign exchange on 
the black market at a less favorable rate in order to deliver the requisite foreign exchange to the 
Central Bank.  The Minimum Registration Price thus influenced the residual rent received by 
exporters, but so long as that rent was positive, the Minimum Registration Price did not impede 
exports.  Export tax rebates were thus not essential to Brazilian competitiveness even within the 
prevailing distorted policy context. Instead, it seems likely that export tax rebates were 
maintained after the 1972 IBC “reforms” because the rebates were privately profitable and called 
forth rent seeking activity to preserve them. 
                                                 
14 Indeed, throughout the 1980s, the export tax was regularly lower than the difference between PA and PD and thus 
never restricted exports.  As a result, the export tax rebates could no longer be justified as an instrument of price   12
  The shift to standardized contracts was expected to reduce the potential for irregularities 
that had been inherent in the creation of special deals for favored large foreign importers.  
However, the shift resulted in the payment of rebates to a much wider set of importers and thus 
probably facilitated and expanded rent-seeking activity.  The value of avisos issued did expand 
and there is ample anecdotal evidence of continued rent-seeking activity during the 1980s.15   
Indeed, Brazil introduced a new type of aviso rebate in 1979, as part of another effort to 
increase its market share.  Brazil was then expecting a return to an ICA quota that had been 
suspended since 1972, and was negotiating its future quota share once the ICA quota was again 
imposed.  Bacha (1992) notes that Brazil hurriedly introduced new export contracts, offering 
strong concessions to the big roasting houses in order to guarantee that Brazil’s 1979 shipments 
would not be lower than Colombia’s 11 million bags.  Brazil was concerned that its negotiating 
position within the ICA would be harmed if its own exports were lower than those of 
Colombia.16  One concession in the new contracts was a “Price-Fall-Guarantee,” essentially a 
cost-free, unilateral hedge covering the period between the date of sale and delivery of the 
coffee. This hedge ensured importers that signing a contract would not penalize them if the 
international price subsequently fell.  For each sack purchased, importers were to receive a rebate 
equal to the difference between the purchase price and the lowest price occurring (using a 10-day 
moving average) between the date of purchase and the expected transit time from Brazil to the 
purchaser’s port of delivery. 
  Unfortunately for Brazil, the international coffee market collapsed thereafter, obligating 
                                                                                                                                                             
discrimination. 
15 Several respondents mentioned a Brazilian saying that "only two agencies in the world can issue US dollars, the 
Federal Reserve Bank and the IBC." Data are not available regarding the amount of avisos received by specific 
importing firms, or how these amounts were determined. That so little information is available regarding the use of 
avisos suggests the possibility of administrative irregularities.  See also Jarvis (2000). 
16 Brazil’s shipments turned out to be 12 million bags, with a full 3 million being shipped in December.   13
the IBC to pay out US$1.3 billion and US$2.0 billion in avisos in 1980 and 1981, respectively.   
Together, the amounts rebated significantly exceeded the gross export tax revenue collected 
during this period.  Since coffee quotas had been reimposed in October 1980, Brazil effectively 
found itself implementing a net export subsidy when exports were quota constrained.  
A coffee quota remained in effect through July 1989, except for a brief period in 
1986/87.17  Throughout this period, Brazil maintained a large export tax rebate of the initial type.  
The early 1980s are the period when major rent transfers appear to have taken place.  Brazil paid 
out large amounts of avisos, a coffee quota was in force and the export tax did not constrain 
exports.  
  The Effect of Export Tax Rebates on Brazil’s Coffee Export Price. Because different 
policies were followed in different periods when export tax rebates were utilized, it seemed 
likely that the effect of the export tax rebates should have differed from one subperiod to 
another. I identified three subperiods for comparison: 1965-71, 1972-79, and 1980-88.  During 
1965-71, an export quota was in effect, the export tax was greater than the unit quota rent—thus 
constraining exports to the quota market, and export tax rebates were paid to only a few large 
importers in exchange for an agreement by these importers to purchase additional coffee. Delfim 
Netto’s theory assumed that the export tax rebate would reduce the constraining export tax, 
allowing a profitable export expansion with no significant effect on the export price (See Figure 
2). However, if the export tax rebate for the favored importers was set too high, it could have 
induced importers to increase purchasers of Brazilian coffee beyond the quota limit, causing an 
increase in the nominal export price.   
During 1980-88, an export quota was in place, but the export tax was smaller than the 
                                                 
17 Jorio Dauster was appointed President of the IBC in January 1987.  He says he was unaware that avisos were 
causing income transfers to foreign importers,  but quickly reduced their use because he thought they were   14
unit quota rent and did not constrain exports to the member market.  Export tax rebates were 
provided to “all” importers of Brazilian coffee.  Assuming that the market was perfectly 
competitive, Brazil’s nominal export price should have risen by the amount of the unit export tax 
rebate, leaving the net export price unchanged. For example, let there be an initial situation in 
which there is no export tax and no export tax rebate, where demand is set equal to a fixed 
supply (the export quota), i.e., D(p) = x - βp = qA, with - β the slope of the demand curve.  This 
yields the initial equilibrium price, p0 = (x - qA)/β.  Then assume that an export tax rebate is paid 
to importers so that it appears as a net reduction in the export price (as the avisos were paid): 
D(p1 - α) = x - β(p1-α) = qA. The new equilibrium price is p1= (x - qA)/β + α, i.e., in a 
competitive market the payment of the aviso reduces the price of Brazilian coffee relative to that 
of other coffees and induces importers to increase the nominal amount paid for Brazilian coffee.  
Since the export price rises by the amount of the export tax rebate, the importer enjoys no net 
gain and Brazil suffers no real loss. However, if the market is not perfectly competitive, 
importers may not bid up the nominal price by the full amount of the unit export tax rebate, in 
which case importers enjoy a net gain and Brazil suffer a net loss. 
During 1972-79, a somewhat different situation held since no export quota was in effect.  
Brazil nonetheless imposed a substantial export tax. Since the export tax rebate was always paid 
to the importer following the purchase, the world market price remained the purchase price from 
the exporter’s viewpoint.  The domestic producer price was determined in keeping with the price 
received by the exporter, net of the gross coffee export tax.  However, the foreign purchaser 
effectively paid a price net of the export tax rebate, with the cost of the rebate being paid from 
the Brazilian government’s coffee export tax revenues. Implementing an export tax rebate 
                                                                                                                                                             
associated with irregular activities among exporting firms.    15
reduced the net export tax, should have led to an increase in exports and, as foreign importers 
moved down their demand curve, a slight decrease in Brazil’s nominal export price.18  Without 
specific analysis, it is impossible to determine whether the coffee export tax was set at the 
economically optimal level, though casual analysis suggests that Brazil’s coffee export tax was 
generally set too high as there has been a large erosion of its market share over time. Assuming 
that the export tax was too high, the use of the export tax rebate may have been welfare 
improving.  However, it would have been more efficient to simply reduce the export tax. 
If these broad characterizations are correct, Brazil’s payment of an export tax rebate is 
likely to have had a significantly negative welfare impact only during the 1980-88 period.  
During 1965-71, the export tax rebates probably led to an expansion of exports to the member 
market and this expansion may have achieved benefits that exceeded the cost of the avisos 
issued.  Regardless, the export tax rebates issued totaled only $220 million and any transfer of 
rents would have been small. Assuming benefits from expanded exports of about $40 million per 
year, Brazil’s welfare was probably not significantly affected during this period of time.   During 
1972-79, Brazil issued $1.8 billion in avisos. These export tax rebates reduced Brazil’s tax 
revenues (assuming that the export tax was not adjusted), but according to theory the tax rebates 
should not have significantly affected Brazil’s nominal coffee export price and could even have 
improved its economic welfare. During 1980-88, however, I believe the harmful effect of the 
export tax rebates was large.  Brazil issued more than $6 billion in avisos during this short period 
and, since the export tax did not constrain exports during this period, the avisos had no effect on 
member market export volume. Brazil thus lost heavily unless importers bid up the nominal 
export price by the full amount of the unit export tax rebate.   
  Econometric Model. Brazil’s domestic coffee export price data are considered 
                                                 
18 The primary effect of the rebates in this situation is to increase the price paid to farmers and thus expand exports.     16
unreliable, but Brazilian and other coffees are traded on international markets, e.g., New York.  
If the use of export tax rebates caused a bidding up of the Brazilian export price, the effect 
should be evident in the New York market since the price there should reflect the export price 
plus a reasonably constant amount for shipping and insurance.  A simple model of the 
relationship to be tested is:  
5)   PSANTOS4 = β0 + β1Alpha + β2PCOMPETITOR + β3RS + ε.   
The dependent variable is the New York price per pound of Santos 4, a major Brazilian 
Arabica coffee traded on the New York market.  PCOMPETITOR is the price of a similar Arabica 
coffee sold by a competitor, e.g., Colombia (MAMS) or Central America (Other Milds). The 
model assumes that the prices of similar coffees move together over time since they are close 
substitutes in consumption, save for substantial variations in relative supply (RS) and the 
potential market distortion created by Brazil’s use of a unit export tax rebate (Alpha). Although 
each of the independent variables in Equation 5) is almost certainly endogenous, I thought 
Ordinary Least Squares likely to provide more robust estimates than Three Stage Least Squares 
because of the limited availability of truly exogenous instruments and thus used both.  I report 
estimates for OLS regressions of Equation 5), an analogous model using first differences and 
also for a system estimated using 3SLS.  The approaches provide similar estimates of β and all 
estimates are highly statistically significant.  
  I ran two regressions for each specification, one using the price of MAMS and the other 
using the price of Other Milds as the competitor’s price. The supply variable attempted to 
capture the effect of unexpected changes in relative supply on the assumption that prices are 
more affected by unexpected rather than expected changes.  To form this variable, the ratio of 
Brazilian to other Latin American exports was regressed on a constant, a time trend, and an   17
autoregressive term, and the residuals from this regression were used as a measure of the 
unexpected annual changes in relative supply (RS).19  Alpha was calculated as the total tax 
rebates redeemed in year t divided by the total pounds of coffee exported in year t.20 Alpha 
measures the average unit rebate in US$ per pound.  Monetary values were deflated using the US 
PPI.  Annual data were used for 1960-1991, 5 years prior to implementation of the rebates and 3 
years after their end.   
In early regressions, the coefficients on relative supply were insignificant and there were 
unusually large residuals in 1977 (positive) and 1979 (negative).  In 1977, Brazil had a year of 
unusually low Brazilian rainfall and the measure of relative supply apparently did not fully 
capture the effect of the resulting supply decline.  I was uncertain what caused the residual in 
1979, but applied dummies to each year.  Their inclusion improved the significance of the 
relative supply variable and did not substantially change the magnitude or significance of any 
other coefficient.  Further, since I expected that the effect of the export tax rebates would differ 
by period, I utilized dummies for the years 1965-71 and 1972-79 interacting with Alpha to test 
whether this was true. Thus, the OLS regression utilized was Equation 6). 
6) PSANTOS4 = β0 + β1Alpha + β2Alpha*D1965-71 + β3Alpha*D1972-79 + β4PCOMPETITOR + β5RS +  
    D 1977 + D1979 + ε.   
The coefficient β1 thus refers to the effect of export tax rebates during the period that is not 
covered by the interactive dummies, i.e., 1980-88.21  The null hypothesis is 0 < β1  < 1.  By the 
                                                 
19 The same relative supply variable was used in both regressions. I tried forming alternative relative supply 
variables linking MAMS to exports of Colombia only and OMILDS to exports of other Latin American countries 
only.  These specifications produced highly similar results for the estimates of β2.  
20  The denominator is the exports of coffee to the member market when a quota was in effect and total exports 
when a quota was not in effect. Non-member importers may also have received avisos, but it is thought that these 
were few.  Exports to non-member importers accounted for about 10% of total exports when the quota was in effect. 
21 The quota lapsed from late 1986 to late 1987.  I included an interactive dummy for 1987; its estimated coefficient 
was negative, as expected, but not significant. Since a relatively small number of avisos were issued in 1988 and   18
theory advanced, β2 could be positive or negative and β3 should be negative.  
Ordinary Least Squares for Equation 6) results are reported as Equations 6.1 and 6.2 in 
Table 2.  All of the estimated coefficients except that on Alpha*D1965-71 are significant in the 
regression using MAMS as the competitor coffee.  The estimate for β1 is equal to 0.45, while the 
estimate for β3 is -0.40, both as expected.  In the regression using Other Milds as the competitor 
coffee, neither of the interactive dummies is significant, though they have the same signs as 
before. The estimate for β1 is 0.5. It appears that Brazil’s use of avisos caused Brazil's coffee 
export price to rise relative to those of its competitors, but by only about half as much as the unit 
export tax rebate itself.  As a result, the net export price fell and importers (or their customers) 
gained greatly during 1980-1986. Brazil effectively transferred a large share of its domestic 
quota rents from the Federal Treasury to recipients of export tax rebates. 
  The results from the OLS regressions are biased and inconsistent since the price of 
Brazilian coffee and those of its competitors are simultaneously determined in world markets.  
Further, the emission of Brazil’s export tax rebates was contractually tied to the difference 
between the prices of Brazilian coffee and a weighted-average of the prices of Other Milds and 
Robusta coffees.  Thus, the emission of avisos was also endogenous.  Indeed, if the amounts 
exported from different countries were a function of the prevailing relative coffee prices, even 
the relative supply variable was endogenous.  I thus estimated the effect of the export tax rebates 
on the international price of Brazilian coffee using Three Stage Least Squares.  The system 
estimated contained four equations, Equations 7), 8), 9), and 10), one each for the price of 
Brazilian coffee, the price of a competitor’s coffee, the unexpected changes in the supply of 
Brazilian coffee relative to that of its competitors, and the number of avisos emitted by the IBC. 
                                                                                                                                                             
their use then terminated, the results reported utilize 1980-88 as the omitted period.     19
7)   PSANTOS4 = β0 + β1Alpha + β2Alpha*D1965-71 + β3Alpha*D1972-79 + β4PCOMPETITOR + β5RS  
   + D1977 + D1979 + ε. 
8) PCOMPETITOR = γ0 + γ1Alpha + γ2Alpha*D1965-71 + γ3Alpha*D1972-79 + γ4PCOMPETITOR + γ5RS 
   + D1977 + D1979 + ε. 
9)   Alpha = ϕ0 + ϕ1PSANTOS4 + ϕ2PCompetitor + ϕ3RS + D1965-71 + D1972-79 + DAVISOS + AR(1) + µ 
10) RS  =  λ0 + λ1PSANTOS4 + λ2PCOMPETITOR + ν 
Equation 7) is identical to equation 6).  The specification of the other equations is 
explained when the results are discussed. The system was again estimated once using MAMS 
and once using Other Milds as the competitor coffee. The results are shown as Equations 7.1 and 
7.2 to 10.1 and 10.2 in Table 3.  Each of the estimated equations performs well.  Nearly all of the 
estimated coefficients have the expected sign, where a sign is indicated, and most coefficients are 
statistically significant.  The Durbin Watson coefficients showed no sign of serial correlation 
after an autoregressive transformation was used in the equation explaining the level of the unit 
export tax rebate, Alpha.   
In each of the two equations estimating the price of Brazilian coffee, PSANTOS4, the 
coefficient on Alpha is again highly significant and less than 1.  Using a Wald Test, the null 
hypotheses that the coefficient on Alpha is either zero or 1 are both rejected at the 1% level.  
Thus, the results again suggest that Brazil’s use of export tax rebates increased the export price 
of Brazilian coffee, but only by about half the amount of the unit tax rebate.  Equally important, 
the coefficients on the interactive dummy for Alpha in the period 1972-79 are negative, as 
expected, and also highly significant when MAMS is used as the competitor coffee.  Using the 
latter equation, a Wald Test indicates that the hypothesis that the export tax rebates had no effect 
on Brazil’s export price during 1972-79 cannot be rejected at the 1% level, again as   20
hypothesized. The coefficient on the dummy for Alpha during the period 1965-71 was always 
insignificant, suggesting that the effect of the export tax rebates during this period could not be 
distinguished from 1980-88, when an export quota was also in effect.  The 1965-71 dummy was 
not included in the final regression.  Each of the coefficients on the competitor’s price is positive 
and significant, as expected, and the coefficients on the relative supply variable are negative, 
again as expected, and significant when MAMS is used as the competitor coffee.  The dummies 
for supply disturbances in 1977 and 1979 are always significant.  
In the equation for the price of competitor’s coffee, PCOMPETITOR, the coefficient on Alpha 
is positive in the MAMS equation and negative in the Other Milds equation.  Although the 
coefficient is not statistically significant in either equation, the result suggests the possibility that 
Brazil’s use of export tax rebates could have caused a decrease in the prices of its competitors' 
coffees by improving Brazil’s competitive position.  The coefficient on PSANTOS4 is positive and 
highly significant, as expected.  The coefficient on relative supply is negative and significant 
when both MAMS and Other Milds are used as the competitor coffee.  A negative coefficient 
was unexpected, but plausible if the increase in Brazilian supply was sufficient to cause the 
prices of all coffee to decline. The supply of Brazilian coffee was highly variable from year to 
year and this variation was the main determinant of price variability in all coffees traded 
internationally during the period studied. 
Little information is available regarding the determinants of Brazil’s export tax rebates 
except that these were contractually tied to the difference between the international price of 
Brazil’s coffee and those of its competitors.  Each of these prices was therefore included as an 
independent variable in the equation explaining the level of Alpha.22  A dummy was also 
                                                 
22 Because export tax rebates increased the international price of Brazilian coffee and perhaps reduced those of its 
competitors, any rebate should have been self-reinforcing, increasing future rebates and thereby transferring   21
included for 1966-1988, since rebates were only issued in this period.  Other dummies were 
included for the periods 1965-71 and 1972-79.23  The coefficients on PSANTOS4 and PCOMPETITOR 
are positive and negative, respectively, and highly significant, as expected.  None of the 
dummies are significant, though all are positive.  The equation for Alpha was estimated using a 
first-order autoregressive transformation since the initial regression had a high DW statistic.  The 
autoregressive term is highly significant.  
In the equation for relative coffee supply, the dependent variable is again specified as the 
unexpected difference in Brazilian supply relative to that of its competitors.  In this equation, the 
estimated coefficients on PSANTOS4 and PCOMPETITOR are positive and negative, as expected, and 
highly significant, suggesting that a higher price of coffee brought forth (primarily from storage) 
a higher supply of coffee of each type. Although hardly any of the variation in the supply 
variable is explained, it is worth repeating that the coefficients on relative supply in the equations 
explaining the price of Brazilian coffee and those of its competitors are significant and have the 
expected signs.24   
Given some uncertainty whether the supply variable was appropriately specified, I also 
estimated a three-equation system, excluding the equation for relative coffee supply. The results 
for these three equations, not shown, were largely the same as those in Table 3.  The coefficients 
on Alpha in the equation for PSANTOS4 were about 20% smaller, while the coefficients on Alpha 
in the equations for PCOMPETITOR were somewhat larger in absolute magnitude, but still negative 
in sign, and their t statistics were higher.  These results suggested a greater possibility that 
                                                                                                                                                             
additional resources to foreign importers at higher fiscal cost. 
23 I tried a dummy for the period 1980-81, but its inclusion caused the coefficients on PSANTOS and PCOMPETITOR to 
become insignificant.   
24  I also tried using the amount of Brazilian coffee exported relative to the aggregate amount of coffee exported by 
its Latin American competitors.  A larger amount of the variance in the dependent variable was explained when this 
supply variable was used, but the coefficients on the relative supply variable were generally insignificant in the   22
Brazilian coffee export tax rebates reduced the prices of their competitors’ coffees, though it 
seems likely that the system including the relative supply variable provides better estimates. 
It is worth emphasizing that the econometric results are wholly consistent with the 
hypotheses of the paper. The OLS estimates and the Three Stage Least Squares estimates are 
highly consistent.  Both indicate that the provision of export tax rebates caused an increase in the 
gross price of Brazilian coffee on the New York market when an export quota was in effect, in 
1965-71 and 1980-86, but had no effect on this price in 1972-79, when no export quota existed.  
The Incidence of Export Tax Rebates.  If the results presented here are broadly 
accurate, foreign roasters gained greatly from Brazil’s emission of export tax rebates.  Using the 
3SLQ results, the rebates raised the gross export price by about $0.50/lb for each $1.00/lb unit 
export tax rebate during the period 1980-88, providing a reduction in the net price of about 
$0.50/lb. The same effect appears to have occurred during 1965-71, but this result is less 
important since a relatively small amount of rebates were issued in this period. If we consider 
only the effect of the $5.9 billion in export tax rebates issued in 1980-88, Brazil transferred $2.95 
billion of its domestic quota rents to foreign importers.25 Roasters’ profits must have increased 
and foreign consumers probably also benefited as a result of competition among roasters. The 
rebates significantly reduced Brazil’s net export tax revenue. Indeed, Brazil’s net export tax 
revenue was negative in 1980 and 1981.  
Brazil’s use of export tax rebates also significantly distorted international coffee prices.  
The rebates increased the gross New York price of Brazilian coffee absolutely and relatively and 
may have reduced, in absolute terms, the international coffee prices of Brazil’s competitors.   As 
an approximate indicator of this effect, Figure 3 shows the estimated absolute increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
equations explaining PSANTOS and PCOMPETITOR.  The coefficients on Alpha were essentially unchanged.    
25 I exclude 1987 since a quota was not in effect during most of the year and 1988 since the amount of rebates   23
price of Santos 4 in New York caused by the rebates, assuming that the gross price rose $0.47 for 
each $1increase in the unit export tax rebate during the periods 1965-71 and 1980-86.  The effect 
was small during 1965-71, but large during 1980-86.  The maximum effect occurred in 1981, 
when the export tax rebates increased the New York price of Santos 4 by more than $0.60/lb. 
This increase implies that the New York price of Santos 4 was 49% higher than it would have 
been had no export tax rebates been paid.  Assuming that the prices of its competitor coffees 
were similar and unchanged, the price of Brazilian coffee also rose proportionately relative to 
their prices.  On average, rebates increased the New York price during 1980-86 by about 
$0.21/lb., or about 18% of the counterfactual price.26  
The use of the export tax rebates is one of several policies used by Brazil that caused the 
international price of Brazilian coffee to vary sharply and unpredictably relative to that of other 
coffees.  These unpredictable variations were the principle reason that the New York market 
decided to delist the Brazilian “B” futures contract.  The delisting of this futures contract has, 
even until today, made it much more difficult for Brazilian traders to hedge against risk. 
A sense of the overall effects of the export tax rebates is provided in Figure 4, which 
presents a) the actual New York price of Santos 4, which reflects the effect of the rebates b) the 
counterfactual New York price that would have occurred had no export tax rebates been emitted, 
c) the net price paid for Santos 4 by foreign importers who received export tax rebates and d) the 
percentage change in the New York price of Santos 4 caused by the export tax rebates.  As can 
be seen, the rebates greatly distorted both the gross and the net price of Brazilian coffee and thus 
significantly affected the international coffee market.  
                                                                                                                                                             
issued was small.   
26 Although the New York price rose, the net price fell to importers that received rebates.     24
Given the magnitude of the price effects, it may seem strange that the issue did not come 
forcefully to light at the time.  However, although the price effects of the rebates were large, 
particularly in 1980 and 1981, they were probably not easily discernible.  The coffee market 
normally exhibits large price fluctuations and these may have masked the price effects of the 
export tax rebates, as shown in Figure 4.  The net price was never publicized.  Those who 
received the rebates had no reason to protest.  The change in prices had little effect on country 
market shares since these were essentially determined by the existence of country export quotas. 
Thus, Brazil’s competitors were probably not greatly affected by the rebates.  The main question 
is why Brazil’s federal government did not respond to the growing fiscal cost of the export tax 
rebates. In large part, it seems that these were hidden within the IBC, which had long been a very 
powerful and largely autonomous institution that controlled and utilized coffee revenues as it 
desired (Jarvis, 2001).  Greater analysis of this issue is warranted.  
Conclusions. The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) restricted world coffee exports 
from 1965 to 1989 in an effort to increase world coffee prices. The ICA imposed a global export 
quota that was divided among producing countries, thereby creating significant domestic rents.  
In Brazil, the largest exporting country, these rents led to significant rent seeking and, ultimately, 
to significant welfare loss.  The greatest component of this loss was associated with the issue of 
export tax rebates that systematically transferred income from Brazil to foreign importers, 
though this effect was never recognized.   
The Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) captured a significant fraction of the domestic coffee 
quota rent through imposition of an export tax.  However, when the coffee export quota was 
implemented in 1965, Brazil was underselling its quota. As this situation suggested that the 
export tax was too high, Brazil decided to provide export tax rebates to qualifying purchasers of   25
its coffee.  These rebates were designed to achieve a “price discriminating” reduction in the 
export tax paid by some importers, thereby increasing Brazil’s exports and net export revenues. 
However, since the rebates conveyed substantial income to recipients, coffee importers avidly 
sought them. Brazilian policy makers/bureaucrats were apparently persuaded to issue growing 
amounts of rebates even after the export quota was filled, presumably by rent seeking activity.  
There is also evidence of significant irregularities in the rebates’ use that seems to have benefited 
domestic exporters as well as some policy makers and/or bureaucrats (Jarvis 2001).  
I show econometrically that the export tax rebates stimulated foreign demand for 
Brazilian coffee, increasing its price relative to those of its competitors.  However, Brazil’s 
export price rose less than the amount of the export tax rebate so that the net price fell.  This 
caused a large real transfer of domestic coffee quota rents to foreign importers and/or consumers.  
Indeed, as a result of the export tax rebates, foreign roasters may have gained more from the ICA 
quota than did Brazil.  
The ICA export quota created a market context within which the export tax rebates 
appeared attractive to Brazil, i.e., the export quota encouraged further government intervention in 
the market and, though the rents created, provided the tax revenues that facilitated payment of 
the rebates.  Nonetheless, it is surprising that Brazil used coffee export tax rebates to effectively 
transfer a large share of its domestic ICA quota rent to foreign roasters.  The ICA was designed 
to increase coffee export revenues for the benefit of coffee exporting countries, not foreign 
roasters, and foreign roasters had no political muscle in Brazil. Brazilians with whom I talked at 
the beginning of this study, both in the private and the public sector, consistently expressed a 
belief that foreign roasters had not received any transfer of rents.  Certainly none of the 
Brazilians that I have talked with believed that such a transfer was warranted.  I conclude that   26
had policy making been informed and rational from a national viewpoint, the use of rebates 
would have remained small and/or their use would have quickly ceased.   
It is still somewhat unclear why Brazil initiated the use of coffee export tax rebates.  
Perhaps they were only intended as a mechanism to allow price discrimination, though Bates 
(personal communication) has suggested that the rebates were implemented to share the benefits 
of the ICA global quota with the large international coffee roasters in at least tacit exchange for 
their political support within the United States during the negotiation of the ICA (see also Bates 
1997).  Others, including Jorio Dauster, one of Brazil's chief negotiators in the ICA in a later 
period, believe that the rebates were initiated only to achieve price discrimination (personal 
communication).  It may be that the roasters perceived a benefit and supported the ICA at least 
partly on this basis, without Brazil having intended the benefit.  
Whatever the origin of the export tax rebate policy, the continuous and expanded use of 
the rebates over a long period, despite reducing net IBC revenue and worsening Brazil’s net 
terms of trade, points to the insidious nature of rent seeking. Any transfer was strikingly at odds 
with the Brazilian government’s often stated objective that it wanted to use the IBC to offset the 
roasters’ perceived market power and thus achieve better prices and higher revenues from coffee.  
It appears likely that relatively small gains to a few officials encouraged the continuation and 
expansion of a policy that eventually imposed enormous costs on Brazil.27  Other conditions, 
including a widespread faith in government intervention as a means to improve Brazilian 
economic welfare, the powerful and largely autonomous IBC, and, during much of the period, a 
military government whose policies reduced public disclosure of information, increased the 
                                                 
27 For example, newly appointed IBC presidents—whose average term in office throughout the period of the ICA 
was 18 months--frequently canceled existing long-term contracts and then signed new contracts with foreign 
roasters (see Bacha, 1992, for examples), a behavior that could signal rent seeking activity. The IBC had 14 
presidents between 1963 and 1987.   27
potential for rent seeking. The complexity of Brazilian coffee policies during this period, 
involving administrative prices, subsidies and the simultaneous use of export taxes and rebates, 
doubtlessly obscured the effects of the rebates and made it easier for observers to accept official 
arguments that the rebates had a neutral welfare effect.28  Further research on the political and 
institutional situation in Brazil may shed additional light on how and why these events occurred.   
Although less developed countries are increasingly adopting market oriented policies and 
eschewing distortions that lead to rent seeking, it is worth noting that the ICA was a commodity 
agreement created jointly by less developed and more developed countries to increase and 
stabilize coffee prices. The price increase was expected to benefit coffee producing countries 
and, particularly, the coffee producers therein.  Instead, it appears that Brazil and most other 
producing countries suffered large net social welfare losses as a result of the rent seeking that the 
export quotas created (e.g., Bohman, et al.).  Within the producing countries, there is reason to 
believe that coffee farmers lost proportionately most heavily (Bohman and Jarvis, 1996).  
Developed country importers gained greatly and such gains may have contributed to their longer 
term political support for maintenance of the ICA (Bates, Jarvis, 2001), as well as their pursuit of 
export rebates within Brazil.  Thus, rent seeking in this case had international as well as national 
characteristics.   
 
                                                 
28 Although foreign roasters appear to have received most of the export tax rebates, domestic roasters, domestic 
soluble producers, and domestic exporters also received sizeable amounts of export tax rebates, especially during the 
1980s.  Since the avisos were negotiable, they provided a convenient instrument for subsidizing the development of 




Akiyama, T. and P.N. Varangis.  1990.  “Impact of the International Coffee Agreement on 
Producing Countries,” The World Bank Economic Review, 4(2). 
Bacha, E. L.  1992.  Brazilian Coffee Policy: A Centennial Evaluation,  Marcellino Martins & E. 
Johnson Exportadores Ltda. 
Bates, R.H. 1997. Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Bertone, M. V.F.  1992.  “Anotacoes Sobre o Acordo Internacional do Café,” Garcafe, Garca, 
Sao Paulo State, processed. 
Bohman, M., L. Jarvis, and R. Barichello. 1996. “Rent Seeking and International Commodity 
Agreements: The Case of Coffee,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 44(2): 
379-402. 
Bohman, M. and L. Jarvis.  1996. “The International Coffee Agreement: A Tax on Producers and 
Consumers?”  University of British Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics 
Working Paper #96-2. 
Bohman, M. and L. Jarvis.  1990.  “The International Coffee Agreement: Economics of the 
Nonmember Market”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 17(1): 99-118. 
Bhagwati, J. N. 1982. “Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities”, Journal of  
Political Economy, 90: 988-1002 
Delfim Netto, A. 1959.  O Problema do Cafe no Brazil, Boletim n. 5, Sao Paulo: Faculdade de 
Ciencias Economicas e Administrativas of the University of Sao Paulo, processed.  
Reprinted by Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 1979.     29
Delfim Netto, A., and C.A. de Andrade Pinto. 1965.  O Cafe do Brazil: 20 Anos de Substituicao 
no Mercado, Sao Paulo: Estudos ANPES, no. 3.   
Krishna, K. and L.H. Tan.  1992. “Rent-Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Evidence from 
U.S.-Hong Kong Trade in Apparel,” World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 
1003. 
Krishna, K., R. Erzan and L.H. Tan.  1993. “Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: 
Theory and Evidence from US Apparel Imports from Hong Kong,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 3673.  
Krueger, A.O.  1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” American Economic 
Review, 64(3): 291-303. 
Jarvis, L. S.  2001. "The Rise and Decline of Rent-Seeking Activity in the Brazilian 
Coffee Sector: Lessons from a Study of the Imposition and Removal of  
International Coffee Agreement Export Quotas," processed, Department of Agricultural  
and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis.   
Tullock, G. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Thefts,” Western Economic 
Journal, Vol. 5 (June): 73-79.  
   30
   
Table 1.  Annual Emission, Redemption and Outstanding Balance of Avisos de Garantia, 
1965-88 
Millions of $ 
 
Year Emission  Redemption  Cancellations  Outstanding  Bal. 
1965  0.9 0.6 0.0 0.3 
1966  22.8 18.4 0.4  4.4 
1967  21.4 23.7 0.6  1.5 
1968  15.4 14.5 0.4  1.6 
1969  23.3 21.6 0.4  2.9 
1970  46.5 46.1 0.3  2.9 
1971  95.5 89.9 1.7  6.8 
1972  76.8 63.1 4.1  15.8 
1973  192.9 192.6 1.1  15.0 
1974  104.8 102.2 1.2  16.4 
1975  408.3 403.4 1.1  20.2 
1976  155.7 149.1 0.5  26.8 
1977  391.8 329.6 14.0  75.1 
1978  405.9 437.8 5.5  37.6 
1979  160.9 163.3 12.8  22.4 
1980  1,310.6 1,031.2 5.7  304.1 
1981  1,917.0 1,990.5 11.4  273.3 
1982  516.9 751.1 10.7  21.8 
1983  546.2 559.2 0.4  8.4 
1984  628.9 608.2 5.9  23.2 
1985  678.2 678.7 3.8  19.4 
1986  302.2 304.5 0.3  16.9 
1987  134.4 136.5 1.6  13.2 
1988  10.8 19.6 0.0  4.4 
Total  8,229.7 8,142.1 83.2  NA 
 
Source: Bertone, 1992, from data originally compiled by the Federacao Brasileira dos 
Exportadores de Cafe (FEBEC).   
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Table 2.  The Effect of Export Tax Rebates on Brazilian Export Price, 1960-1991
@ 
 
Dependent Variable  PSantos 4 P Santos 4 
    
 (6.1)  (6.2) 
Independent Variables    
    
Constant -0.07
  -0.04 





 (9.13)  (8.03) 
Alpha*D1965-71 0.26  0.32 
 (0.56)  (0.53) 
Alpha*D1972-79 -0.40
a -0.15 


















 (4.79)  (4.79) 
    
DW 2.21  2.02 
Adjusted R





@  The competitor price in Eqs. 2.1 is that for MAMS and the competitor price for Eqs 2.2  
is that for Other Milds, each as quoted on the New York market.
 
& Alpha = (avisos redeemed in year t)/(Brazilian coffee exports in year t), i.e., the unit coffee 
export tax rebate. 
# The independent variable is the deviation from trend of the relative supply of Brazilian and 
Colombian coffee, i.e., XBrazil/XColombia.
 
 
a  Coefficient significant at 1%
 
b   Coefficient significant at 5% 
c Coefficient significant at 10% 
 
Source: Data on prices and exports taken from Bacha, 1992, Statistical Appendix.  Data on 
Avisos from Bertone, 1992. 
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Table 3:  Three Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Export Tax Rebates  









Equations 7.1 and 7.2 where dependent variable is PSantos4 
Constant        -0.01    0.07     0.04  0.30
PCompetitor            0.92*  13.29       0.95*  8.88
Alpha            0.42*  7.24       0.52*  6.71
Alpha1972-79          -0.50*  3.43   -0.09  0.41
D1977            1.31*  11.42      0.99*  4.95
D1979          -0.35*  4.34     -0.42*  3.24
Relative Supply  -0.45***  -1.93           -0.40  -1.09
Durbin-Watson 2.14    1.96  
Adjusted R
2 0.99    0.99  
     
Equations 8.1 and 8.2 where dependent variable is PCompetitor 
Constant         0.72*  6.58   0.56*  6.08
PSantos4         0.55*  6.98   0.59*  9.46
Alpha       0.02  -0.19         -0.07  -0.76
Alpha1972-79       0.31  1.06 0.01  0.04
Relative Supply       -1.62*  -3.54   1.48*  4.03
Durbin-Watson 2.25    1.91
Adjusted R
2 0.83    0.87  
     
Equations 9.1 and 9.2 where dependent variable is Alpha 
Constant          0.72**  2.03        0.61**  2.37
PSantos4        0.59*  2.86      0.82*  5.12
PCompetitor        -1.04**  -2.62     -1.31*  -4.77
D1965-71             0.04  0.20     0.23  1.40
D1972-79             0.08  0.30     0.30  1.36
DAVISOS     0.23  1.49     0.12  0.97
AR(1)       0.83*  7.02       0.84*  7.62
Durbin-Watson 2.03  1.83
Adjusted R
2 0.35    0.56
  
Equations 10.1 and 10.2 where dependent variable is Relative Supply 
Constant        0.33*  4.31      0.34*  4.97
PSantos4        0.25*  2.87      0.33*  4.03
PCompetitor       -0.45*  -3.93           -0.58*  -5.42
Durbin-Watson 2.36  2.08
Adjusted R
2 0.13  -0.15
* ,**, and *** denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
































* Allprices, taxes and tax rebates converted toUS$
(inc. revenue due D)
(net importer
Figure 1.  A model of Brazilian policy with rent
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Figure 3a) Use of export tax rebates to achieve price discrimination














Figure 3b) Net effect of export tax rebates on Brazilian Welfare  35
 
Figure 3. Estimated Effect of Export Tax Rebates on 



























































Counterfactual New York Price of Santos 4 without Export Tax Rebates
Net Price to Importers of Santos 4 after Export Tax Rebate
Actual New York Price of Santos 4
Percent Change in New York Price Due to Rebates